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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
juvenile court either granting or denying motions for reference." ' 7 The
opinion of the supreme court and the special concurring opinion of Jus-
tice MacLaughlin 5 discuss this problem and correctly urge the Minne-
sota Legislature to consider seriously the problem of the lack of separate
facilities for hardcore juvenile offenders.
In conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court in I. Q. S. held that the
denial of a reference motion is appealable by the state, the Minnesota
reference statute and procedure are constitutional, and findings-of-fact
will be required of Minnesota juvenile courts in the future to facilitate
judicial review. While the Minnesota reference statute is constitutional,
the Minnesota Legislature should add specific criteria to be considered
by juvenile courts when applying the two standards set out in the refer-
ence statute. Additional criteria would supplement the findings-of-fact
requirements of L Q. S. and could be designed to help eliminate unneces-
sary judicial discretion, while leaving sufficient discretion to allow the
juvenile courts to function in their parens patriae role. In addition, the
legislature should consider the need for a separate secure facility for
hardcore juvenile offenders.
Liquor Licensing-SuPREME COURT REVERSAL OF A MUNICIPALrrY's DE-
NIAL OF A LimsE-Wajda v. City of Minneapolis, - Minn. -, 246
N.W.2d 455 (1976).
In Wajda v. City of Minneapolis,' the Minnesota Supreme Court
made an unprecedented decision to reverse a municipality's denial of a
liquor license. The appellant had operated or leased a 3.2 beer tavern
from 1954 until 1970 without violations of the law or neighborhood prob-
lems. Subsequently, the appellant leased the premises, first to her son
and later to an unrelated tenant. Each of these tenants obtained a
license to operate the tavern, as required by city ordinance.' During
67. - Minn. at _ 244 N.W.2d at 39.
68. Justice MacLaughlin, concurring specially in I.Q.S., elaborated on the difficult
questions of fact and policy involved in providing a separate facility for hardcore juvenile
offenders. On one side is the belief that some hardcore juvenile offenders can be rehabili-
tated, consistent with the purposes and directions of the Juvenile Court Act, if a separate
facility is provided. Such a facility would avoid placing juveniles in an adult detention
facility which, it is generally agreed, decreases the chance of rehabilitation. On the other
side is the Department of Corrections' conclusion that it is not feasible to develop a
separate secure facility for hardcore juvenile offenders. See id. at -, 244 N.W.2d at 41-
43. See generally Boxmeyer, supra note 6.
1. - Minn. -, 246 N.W.2d 455 (1976).
2. MINNEAPous, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCaS § 366.10 (1976) requires that every seller
of beer be licensed. A license may be transferred, but the application procedures for
transfers, renewals, and new licenses are essentially the same. See id. § 366.110. Applica-
tions are investigated by the police license inspector. See id. § 366.150. Hearings on
applications are then held by a committee of the city council. See id. §§ 366.180, .200.
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these tenancies, numerous violations occurred. In 1974, after the city
threatened the unrelated tenant with revocation of his license, he closed
the bar. Shortly thereafter, the appellant applied for a license, a hearing
was held, and the application was denied.
The city stated two grounds for its denial of the application: the
misconduct of the former tenant-licensees and the unsuitable location
of the tavern.' On appeal, the district court upheld the denial. The
Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issues of whether the city had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application on each of
the two stated grounds. The court held that the denial was arbitrary and
capricious' and directed the district court to order the city council to
issue the license.' Three justices dissented.'
In resolving the issues, the court relied on well-settled principles gov-
erning its review of discretionary administrative decisions. Under these
principles, the police power of a municipality includes the discretion to
make reasonable regulations about the conduct of both intoxicating and
nonintoxicating liquor businesses.7 The test of a discretionary action is
reasonableness.' There must be a rational relationship between the pur-
pose of the discretionary action and the facts. The role of the reviewing
court is limited to determining whether the action was arbitrary and
capricious.'
3. See - Minn. at -_, 246 N.W.2d at 457.
4. See id.
5. See id. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 459.
6. See id. at __, 246 N.W.2d at 459-61. Justice Otis wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Peterson joined and Justice MacLaughlin concurred. For a discussion of
their dissent, see notes 21-25, 29 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., State v. Kuss, 250 Minn. 236, 240-41, 84 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1957) (nonintoxi-
cating liquors subject to the same police power as intoxicating liquors; regulation that
nonintoxicating liquors cannot be given away free at a business establishment is within
the police power); Cleveland v. County of Rice, 238 Minn. 180, 184, 56 N.W.2d 641, 644
(1952) (control of nonintoxicating liquors is subject to the same considerations as intoxi-
cating liquors in the exercise of the police power to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare; county can require early closing of taverns in rural areas). See also MINN. STAT.
§ 340.02 (1976) (regulating nonintoxicating liquor licenses); id. § 340.11, as amended by
Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 607, § 1, Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 343 (West) (regulation of
intoxicating liquor licenses); MINNEAPOus, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 366 (1976) (regu-
lating beer licenses).
8. The test of reasonableness was articulated in State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 131,
43 N.W. 789, 789 (1889):
By the term "reasonable" we do not mean expedient, nor do we mean that the
conditions must be such as the court would impose. . . .They are to be deemed
reasonable where, although perhaps not the wisest and best that might be
adopted, they are fit and appropriate to the end in view, to wit, the protection
of the public, and are manifestly adopted in good faith for that purpose.
9. E.g., Sabes v. City of Minneapolis, 265 Minn. 166, 171, 120 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1963);
George Benz Sons v. Ericson, 227 Minn. 1, 11, 34 N.W.2d 725, 730 (1948); see In re Wilson,
32 Minn. 145, 148, 19 N.W. 723, 725 (1889) (in reviewing discretionary action, "courts will
not look closely into mere matters of judgment, and set up their own judgment against
19781
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In support of its denial of the license on the basis of the misconduct
of the former licensees, the city council had presented arguments going
to both the actual and the imputed unfitness of the appellant. Ordinar-
ily, it is a permissible exercise of a city council's discretion to judge the
character of an applicant to determine actual fitness. 10 The standard
requirement is that the applicant be of good moral character." The
inquiry focuses on criminal behavior or previous improper conduct in
operating a business." The city council did not dispute the appellant's
good moral character and record as a former licensee. Rather, it main-
tained that the appellant's age and sex made her incapable of being
"strong" enough to manage the tavern, which had become disreputa-
ble. 3 The appellant's admission that her sons would probably help her
run the tavern was a significant factor in the council's finding of actual
unfitness."
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the notion that the appel-
lant's age and sex made her "presumptively incapable" of running the
tavern lawfully, especially in light of her past performance. The court
concluded that the city council's claim of the appellant's actual unfit-
ness was speculative and therefore arbitrary and capricious. 5 The court
emphasized that the council, rather than prejudging the appellant's
that of municipal authorities, when there is a reasonable ground for a difference of opin-
ion").
10. See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Reiter, 140 Minn. 491, 493,168 N.W. 714, 715 (1918);
State v. Scatena, 84 Minn. 281, 285, 87 N.W. 764, 765 (1901); State ex rel. Martin v.
Barrett, 248 Wis. 621, 627, 22 N.W.2d 663, 666 (1946).
11. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.6 (West 1949) (licenses may be issued only to
applicants "of good moral character"); MINN. STAT. § 340.02(8) (1976) (same).
12. See Lehan v. Greigg, 257 Iowa 823, 827-28, 135 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1965) (city council
could not have found good moral character where applicant had been convicted of misde-
meanors and statute specifically excluded from "person of good moral character" someone
who had been convicted of indictable misdemeanor); Madsen v. Town of Oakland, 219
Iowa 216, 221, 257 N.W. 549, 551 (1934) (applicant's "habits and customs as to the
observance or violation of the law" relate to question of good moral character); C & L Co.
v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 190 Neb. 91, 92-94, 206 N.W.2d 49, 50-51 (1973)
(applicant's previous unlawful bookkeeping practises evinced lack of good moral character
sufficient to justify denial of liquor license).
13. See - Minn. at - , 246 N.W.2d at 458.
14. See Respondents' Brief at 11. In refusing to allow the relationship of mother and
sons to be considered by the council in finding unfitness, the court seems to depart from
cases in other jurisdictions that allow an applicant's relationship to former licensee-
violators to be grounds for denial of the license. See Wilks v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 122
Conn. 443, 446, 190 A. 262, 263 (1937) (denial based on applicant's imputed unfitness;
applicant's husband was a former licensee-violator); Mississippi State Tax Comm'n v.
Moore, 209 So. 2d 832, 836 (Miss. 1968) (denial based on applicant's not being the true
owner of the premises; applicant acted as the agent of her father, a former licensee-
violator); McCanless v. State ex rel. Hamm, 181 Tenn. 308, 313-14, 181 S.W.2d 154, 156
(1944) (denial based on belief that applicant's brother-in-law, a former licensee-violator,
would help run the business).
15. See - Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 458.
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ability, could later revoke the license if actual unfitness were mani-
fested."6
The council also argued that unfitness could be imputed to the appel-
lant. The council relied on three factors to impute unfitness: the appel-
lant's relationship as landlady to the former licensees, her ability to
control the licensees' conduct, and her knowledge of the licensees' viola-
tions. 17
The supreme court rejected these three factors as well. First, making
the appellant responsible for her tenants' misconduct because of her
status as landlady is an impermissible extension of the common law, the
court stated." Second, a municipality may not attempt to delegate its
power to enforce a liquor ordinance by requiring a landlady to supervise
her tenants." Finally, it was "patently contrary to the evidence" to draw
an inference that the appellant had knowledge of her tenants' miscon-
duct. 0
The dissenting justices, on the other hand, thought that the council
had made reasonable inferences in deciding that the appellant was
unfit. The inference that the appellant knew of her tenants' misconduct
was supported by evidence that neighbors had signed a petition to the
city complaining about the tavern's operation and testimony that the
appellant was present when the city complained to one of the tenant-
licensees and threatened to close the tavern.2 ' The dissent also found
that state policy permits the imposition of penalties on a lessor for the
misconduct of tenant-licensees." Because of this policy and because the
appellant could have cancelled her tenants' leases when they used the
property unlawfully, the dissent thought it was not an impermissible
delegation of responsibility for the city to require the appellant to con-
trol her tenants' conduct." Finally, the inference of actual unfitness of
the appellant was supported by the appellant's admission that her sons
might help her run the tavern and by the fact that she was a fifty-eight
year-old widow.u The conclusion of the dissenting justices was that the
court was substituting its findings for the council's.?
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. In effect, the council was attempting to make the appellant vicariously liable
for the illegal acts of her tenants. See id. Ordinarily, the imposition of such liability
requires a tort situation and a master-servant relationship between the parties. See, e.g.,
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRrs § 69, at 458 (4th ed. 1971). Neither of these
requirements obtained in Wajda.
19. See - Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 458.
20. Id.
21. See id. at , 246 N.W.2d at 460 (Otis, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at __, 246 N.W.2d at 460-61. MINN. STAT. § 340.19(2) (1976) limits further
licensing of an owner's premises if the owner's tenant-licensee has violated the statute
governing intoxicating liquors.
23. See - Minn. at - , 246 N.W.2d at 460-61.
24. See id. at __, 246 N.W.2d at 461.
25. See id. at __, 246 N.W.2d at 460.
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The dissenting justices also disagreed with the court's disposition of
the second issue-whether the council had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in denying the license on the grounds of the tavern's unsuitable
location. A city council, in exercising its discretion, may use the nature
of the building, its location, and its relationship to other buildings as
factors in determining suitability." In rejecting the council's claim of
unsuitability, the majority relied on the fact that the tavern had been
granted a nonconforming use permit when the property had been re-
zoned from commercial to residential.2 The existence of the permit,
coupled with the lack of evidence of the premises' inherent unsuitabil-
ity, led the court to conclude that the council acted arbitrarily in using
the premises' unsuitability as a reason for the denial.2m The dissenting
justices thought that the majority had no basis for holding the council's
findings arbitrary and capricious in view of the numerous ordinance
violations and neighborhood complaints."
The court's position on these issues raises two significant questions.
First, to what extent is the court narrowing a city council's discretion
to judge fitness of an applicant and unsuitability of premises? Second,
what prompted the court to deviate from its practise of giving wide berth
to discretionary administrative decisions?
It seems possible that the court was attempting to confine the city
council's discretion in deciding the fitness of an applicant to written
objective criteria, compliance with which would make the grant of an
application virtually automatic. Similarly, discretion in deciding suit-
ability of the premises could be confined to some objective criteria such
as inadequacy of the building.
However, the court was careful to restrict its decision to the Wajda
facts and to recognize its own narrow scope of review. Furthermore, a
post-Wajda decision makes it clear that the court views the existing
ordinance standards as minimum requirements only."0 Thus the council
may exercise discretion and deny a license even after an applicant has
met these minimums.31
26. See Polman v. City of Royalton, - Minn. - , 249 N.W.2d 466 (1977) (permit
denied because tavern located in area which already had many liquor businesses); State
v. Scatena, 84 Minn. 281, 285, 87 N.W. 764, 765 (1901) (to control liquor businesses, a
municipality may regulate "with regard to the character of the people permitted to engage
in it, the character of buildings . . . and the location with reference to other lines of
business, all with the purpose of restraining any unwholesome influences likely to flow
therefrom"); State ex rel. Higgins v. City of Racine, 220 Wis. 107, 110, 264 N.W. 490, 492
(1936) (establishing good moral character does not prevent denial if the proposed location
is not a proper place because of the surroundings).
27. See - Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 459.
28. See id.
29. See id. at _ 246 N.W.2d at 461.
30. See Country Liquors, Inc. v. City Council of Minneapolis, - Minn....
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The answer to the first question, therefore, seems to be that the court
is not narrowing the council's discretion. Rather, the court decided that
in this particular case the city council was making an impermissible use
of otherwise permissible criteria. The court is requiring that the unfit-
ness considered by the council be that of the applicant, not that of the
applicant's relatives or tenants;" and the unsuitability be that of the
location itself, not that resulting from past misconduct of others.3
The more significant question is what prompted the court to depart
from its traditional deference to discretionary action involving liquor
licenses. Differing explanations of the court's disposition of the case are
possible. The first is that the court decided on the facts that the council
abused its discretion in denying the license: under its standards of unfit-
ness, the council had to conclude that the facts supported granting the
license.
Because the dissent disagreed about whether the standards were in
fact misapplied, however, this explanation exposes the court to the criti-
cism of having substituted its own judgment for that of the city council.
If the court did substitute its own judgment, the decision undermines
the city council's standards without providing discernible guidelines.
The council would then be put in the uneasy position of not knowing
what standards and what applications of them would pass muster.
A second explanation is that the court found in the Wajda facts a
vehicle for expressing judicial disapproval of a political situation that
had developed around liquor licensing in the City of Minneapolis. For
some time prior to Wajda, the possibility of licensing misconduct by city
council members had become prominent news.m This news may have
prompted the court to find the occasion for reminding the city council
that the power to make discretionary decisions is not absolute. The
Wajda facts, being very close, supplied the occasion.
A third explanation places the decision within the apparent trend to
give greater procedural protection to persons whose interests are con-
32. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Marx, Wolinski's Name Recurs in Tavern Deals, Minneapolis Star, Apr.
6, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 2 (police and aldermen failed to challenge license application of
alderman's 19-year-old daughter, as secretary of corporation, despite earlier concern by
police when she had applied for the license as an individual); Rigert, Coleman & Sull-
wold, Liquor Licensing Reform Long Ignored, Minneapolis Tribune, Apr. 16, 1976, § A,
at 1, col. 3 ("Under the present law and the system, campaign contributions from liquor
are closely related to decisions on licenses, police investigations of license applicants are
not always adequate, and questionable city council decisions are sometimes made on the
licenses."); Rigert, Coleman & Sullwold, Politics and Liquor: Is It a Healthy Mix?,
Minneapolis Tribune, Apr. 15, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 1 ("Many applicants for liquor licenses
suspect that political considerations-at the police level and on the city council-played
the key part in action taken on their applications."); Jury Likely to Start Probe of Liquor
Licensing in June, Minneapolis Star, May 26, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 4 (special grand jury
called to "investigate alleged irregularities in the Minneapolis retail liquor industry and
possible political corruption in the issuance and transfer of liquor licenses").
6
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trolled by administrative decisions. Evidence of such a trend can be seen
in recent United States Supreme Court decisions which have, in effect,
eliminated the distinction between rights and privileges, 5 thus remov-
ing one of the chief obstacles to due process claims.3" Lower court deci-
sions in the wake of those cases tailor due process requirements to the
interest at stake, rather than preserving the right-privilege distinction.37
Likewise, legislative enactments and regulations afford procedural pro-
tections to persons whose interests are significantly affected." The Min-
neapolis city ordinances providing hearings on license applications are
an example of this.3 ' Regardless of whether the procedural requirements
originate in the due process clause, case law, or statute, they force ad-
ministrative bodies to give reasons for the action taken. When reasons
35. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)
("[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process
rights."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (right of parolee to a pre-
revocation hearing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (hearing prior to suspension
of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (pretermination hearing
for recipient of public assistance benefits).
36. The due process clause could be invoked only to protect rights, not privileges. In
many cases, the court's characterization of the subject matter as a privilege meant that
due process claims were precluded. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnes-
sey, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("Admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege.");
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937) (no right to probation); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571, 580-81 (1934) (consent of United States to be sued is a privilege);
Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924) (business of carrying passengers on city
streets is a privilege); McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (1892) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman."); Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186,
190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948) (liquor license is a privilege).
37. See, e.g., Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 719-22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Public
Health Service regulations constitutionally deficient for failing to provide a trial-type
hearing for "at-will" employee dismissed for cause); Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212,
1217-18 (4th Cir. 1975) (retail grocer entitled to de novo review of administrative action
that penalized his violations of federal food stamp regulations); Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 483
F.2d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1973) (prisoner threatened with solitary confinement entitled to
notice and hearing, but not to statement of evidentiary basis for proposed action); Van
Blaricom v. Forscht, 473 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 1973) (parolee entitled to pre-
revocation hearing, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and a written statement of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for revocation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975);
Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003-04 (4th Cir. 1970) (tenant of
subsidized low-rent housing entitled to preeviction notice detailing reasons for proposed
eviction, opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, representation by counsel, and
a decision based on evidence adduced at hearing by impartial hearing officer), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
38. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 79.14-18 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (boards of educa-
tion must establish evaluation criteria for teachers and provide notice, hearing, and ap-
peal procedures to terminate teachers' employment); MiNN. STAT. § 15.0418 (1976) (all
parties have right to notice and hearing in a contested case); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1977)
(state plans for public welfare assistance must include notice and hearing provisions).
39. See MiNNEAPous, MINN., CODE oF ORDiNANcEs §§ 366.180, .200 (1976).
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must be articulated, it follows that administrative bodies develop stan-
dards or guidelines, and this, in turn, insures that administrative action
is applied fairly and evenly." Clearly, this goes beyond mere procedure
and affects the action substantively.
A broad perspective on Wajda places it within this trend. By provid-
ing a hearing, the city council invokes the standards of fairness that
procedural safeguards imply." The court's reversal of the council's deci-
sion, which was made after a full hearing, indicates the court's concern
with standards rather than facts. Wajda requires articulated and rea-
sonable standards susceptible of uniform application. Thus, the court
has reaffirmed the principles of fairness and reasonableness underlying
the recent trend of affording procedural safeguards in administrative
actions. Viewed in this light, Wajda is less subject to the dissent's criti-
cism that the court substituted its own judgment and is more consistent
with the majority's express position that it was making a cautious exer-
cise of its own power.
The impact of Wajda as precedent is uncertain. The unique facts of
Wajda would allow the court to distinguish it in future cases or to invoke
it whenever the court felt that a city council needed a reminder of the
scope of its power. However, such a negative application seems certainly
not to have been intended by the court. When viewed in the larger
perspective of procedural considerations, the positive application of
Wajda becomes clearer. The court has reaffirmed a standard that has
always been the law: fairness. The court does not require a city council
to develop standards that would automatically entitle a person to a
license. But it does require that each applicant be subject to the same
articulated criteria as every other applicant. In sum, the court's reversal
of the council's decision may be unprecedented, but it is not an aberra-
tion. The Wajda decision is basic assurance that the standard of fairness
that confines the exercise of discretionary action will not be ignored.
40. Justice Douglas noted this effect of procedural safeguards in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring):
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule
by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural
safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.
41. It seems clear that the source of the procedural protections in WaJda was the city
ordinances and not case law or the due process clause. The Minnesota court recently
reiterated its position that the due process clause does not protect liquor licenses because
applicants have neither a liberty nor a property interest in a liquor license. See Country
Liquors, Inc. v. City Council of Minneapolis, - Minn. -, -, 264 N.W.2d 821, 825-
26 (1978) (en banc). But see Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1974) (due
process requires a hearing with opportunity to cross-examine and a statement of reasons
for denial of a liquor license). See also Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 661-62 (1893)
(liquor license is not a right); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890) (same).
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